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This paper studies the welfare implications of di⁄erent institutions certifying envi-
ronmental quality supplied by a monopoly. The monopolist can voluntarily certify
the quality of the product through an eco-label provided either by an NGO or a
for-pro￿t private certi￿er (PC). The NGO and the PC may use advertisement to
promote the label. We compare the NGO and PC regimes with the regime where the
regulator imposes a minimum quality standard. The presence of a private certi￿er
in the market decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green
advertisement reinforces the above result.
JEL classi￿cation: D62, L15, L31, L51, Q50.
Keywords: Environmental quality; Certi￿cation; Green advertisement; NGO;
Self-regulation.1 Introduction
Beside the traditional ￿command and control￿approach and the market based in-
struments to regulate the environment, voluntary actions for abating pollution have
been undertaken by ￿rms. One reason for ￿self-regulation￿is the emergence of green
consumers, at least in developed nations, willing to pay a higher price for products
of less impact on the environment.1 Firms, expecting higher pro￿ts by di⁄erenti-
ating their products in terms of environmental performance and thereby charging
a higher price to these green consumers, have voluntarily reduced pollution. To be
e⁄ective, such a di⁄erentiation in terms of environmental performance has to be
credibly signalled to consumers. In e⁄ect, environmental quality of a product which
involves production process, product components and raw materials is usually ob-
servable neither before nor after purchase and use, being a credence attribute of the
product. We focus our analysis on environmental quality but this could apply also
to problems like child labor, fair trade, etc; whenever consumers care about features
of the good that are not observable from consumption. The most e⁄ective way to
solve this type of information problem and to signal product quality is to rely on
third party certi￿cation (Cason and Gangadharan, 2002). Certi￿cation is a process
where a third party veri￿es the ful￿lments of a ￿rm to certain criteria or standards.
Certi￿cation programs can be sponsored and/or administrated by governments or
private companies (for pro￿t and non-pro￿t). These organizations provide infor-
mation in di⁄erent ways. While private companies tend to provide information by
setting up voluntary codes of conduct and then providing labels to ￿rms that com-
ply, the regulator has the possibility to exclude from the market products that do
not ful￿ll some standards.
Among the voluntary schemes promoted by private ￿rms we have (eco)-labels.
Eco-labels signal the products of less impact from production and use on the environ-
ment and can command a higher market price. This price premium gives producers
an economic incentive to incur the additional costs associated with meeting the stan-
dards (Blend, p.1). Eco-labels provide an opportunity to inform consumers about
product characteristics that may not be readily apparent.2
1Khanna (2001) presents a very comprehensive review of the current theoretical and empirical
literature on voluntary cooperative environmental programs.
2A distinction should be made between self-label, where the interested party certi￿es the claim
of the product and third party eco-labels where veri￿cation is carried out by an independent source
that awards labels to products based on certain environmental criteria or standards.
1The aim of our paper is to understand the multiplicity and the diversity of the
institutions regulating environmental quality. We study the welfare implications of
the coexistence of public and private environmental quality certi￿cation schemes.
The public certi￿er is a regulator, the private certi￿er may be either an NGO3
which is a non pro￿t institution or a for-pro￿t private certi￿er (PC).4 These certi￿ers
mainly di⁄er in the way of providing information and in the mandatory character
of their certi￿cation schemes. The regulator maximizes social welfare and sets a
mandatory minimum quality standard. The NGO and the private certi￿er pro-
pose a non compulsory label. The NGO maximizes environmental quality whereas
the private certi￿er maximizes her pro￿t. The NGO and the PC may use green
advertisement to promote the label. The green advertisement aims at educating
(persuading) consumers to buy more environmentally friendly goods. It is widely
observed that private certi￿ers use the media to make consumers aware of the impact
of buying polluting products, among other green issues.
Our paper builds mainly on the literature of self-regulation and certi￿cation.
We focus mainly on Auriol and Schilizzi (2003), Alexander and Harding (2003) and
Heyes and Maxwell (2004). Alexander and Harding (2003) also compare public and
private certi￿cation schemes but they rather focus on ￿rms￿incentives to adhere
to a label provided by a private cert￿er. Auriol and Schilizzi (2003) compare the
performance of a privately funded certi￿cation against a public funded certi￿cation.
Our focus goes beyond the incentives of the monopolist to voluntarily adhere to a
private label, moreover, we study the incentives of a public or private (for-pro￿t
and not for pro￿t) certi￿er to participate in the market and we allow for strategic
interaction between them.
The closest to us in spirit is Heyes and Maxwell (2004). They compare the
environmental and welfare implications of having either a public compulsory policy
(a MQS) set by a World Environmental Organization (WEO) or a voluntary label
certi￿cation set by an NGO. We di⁄er in their approach by including in our analysis
the persuasion made by the private certi￿er through the green advertisement. As
3Examples of non-pro￿t institutions awarding eco-labels can be found in the Global Ecolabelling
Network (GEN), an international non-pro￿t association of third-party, environmental performance
labelling organizations.
4Ecocert is an example of a for-pro￿t private certi￿er. It highlights the organic attributes
of a product by delivering a label to producers that ful¢ ll some environmental criteria. For more
information on Ecocert see http://www.ecocert.com. Another example is the Scienti￿c Certi￿cation
Systems (SCS), a commercial ￿rm whose Environmental division certi￿es a wide variety of claims
related to environmental achievement in product manufacturing and natural resource extraction.
2a consequence, we develop a vertical di⁄erentiation model ￿ la Mussa and Rosen
(1978) with consumers di⁄erentiated by their willingness to pay for environmental
quality and a multi-product (quality) monopoly.
The green advertisement can be an informative or a persuasive instrument. In-
formative advertisement only conveys information about the product attributes
(Ibanez and Stenger, 2000 and Petrakis et al., 2005). We rather follow the sec-
ond strand of the literature where advertisement, done by the labeler, is persuasive.
Persuasive advertisement convince consumers to buy more environmentally friendly
goods. Similar to Yu (2005) we stress the relevance of persuasion to shift policy to-
wards the ideal outcome of the NGO. The green advertisement increases the utility
of consumers buying the label independent of the quantity of consumers buying it.
In this sense it is not a social norm (Lombardini-Riipinen, 2002). It is rather an
individual norm but di⁄ers from the work of Brekke et al. (2003) as we do not
compute any morally ideal behavior. The e⁄ect of such an advertisement on con-
sumers￿preferences is taken into account when the regulator interacts with a private
certi￿er. Otherwise the optimal standard policy would be misrepresented (Bar-Gill
and Fershtman, 2005). When comparing the MQS with the NGO label we study
the indirect e⁄ects of the green advertisement on prices and quality. Comparisons
are also made when the advertisement level is set at zero.
We ￿rst look at scenarios where there is only one certi￿er in the market and
we make social welfare comparisons. The NGO sets, in all cases, a higher quality
level than the PC or the regulator. Afterwards, we allow for interactions between
the certi￿ers and look at the changes of optimal standard setting in the presence
of a private ecolabel alternative and green advertisement. When the regulator is
alone in the market the MQS corrects the externality problem by increasing average
environmental quality. When the regulator interacts with a private certi￿er the
MQS decreases average environmental quality, since it decreases demand for the
high quality variant. The role of the MQS, when interacting with the NGO or the
PC, is rather to correct for the excessive di⁄erentiation in order to increase consumer
surplus and pro￿ts. We show that there is less public intervention in the presence
of an eco-label alternative.
When the regulator interacts with a private certi￿er, the green advertisement de-
creases the scope for public intervention. Optimal standard setting clearly depends
on the institution the regulator interacts with.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model.
3In section 3, only public certi￿cation is available. We study the optimal MQS
chosen by the regulator. Section 4 explores the NGO regime. The NGO sets a
quality level at which a label is awarded to the monopolist. We study the e⁄ect on
welfare of the label package constituted by a given level of environmental quality
and a level of green advertisement. We next allow for strategic interaction between
the regulator and the NGO. Section 5 shows what would be the label settled by a
for-pro￿t private certi￿er. We also explore the consequences on quality when the
PC and the regulator interact in the market. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We develop a monopoly model of vertical di⁄erentiation. Environmental quality is
our vertical di⁄erentiation variable. Consumers, then, prefer high environmental
quality products to low quality ones when o⁄ered at the same price. The supply
side consists of a monopoly selling at most two environmental quality variants of
its product. The monopoly chooses the quality q of its variants in the range of en-
vironmental qualities technically feasible given by [q;q]. The monopoly can charge
di⁄erent prices for the good to re￿ ect the di⁄erential in cost made for environmental
quality. The production technology involves marginal cost of production indepen-
dent of the quantity of good produced but strictly increasing and convex in the
environmental quality q and is represented by C(q) = cq2.
The demand side of the market consists of a continuum of consumers indexed by
￿. The taste parameter ￿ can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay for
environmental quality and is uniformly distributed on [￿;￿]. Each consumer either
buys one unit of the di⁄erentiated commodity or does not participate at all in the
market. If he does not buy the good, he has a reservation utility which is normalized
to zero. Adapting from Cremer and Thisse (1999), the indirect utility of a consumer
of type ￿ who buys a variant of perceived environmental quality q at price p is given
by
V￿(p;q;E) = ￿q ￿ p + ￿E (1)
where E is the average environmental quality over all consumers. The parameter
￿ > 0 measures the marginal social bene￿t of the externality associated to the
average environmental quality.5 To build up our model we assume that the consumer
5We suppose that the externality a⁄ects all consumers￿utility in the same way.
4with the highest valuation for quality is willing to pay twice the marginal cost
of the lowest quality variant: ￿ > 2cq. Private certi￿ers can make use of green
advertisement, denoted by ￿ with ￿ 2 [0; ￿
3).6 Using q(￿) to denote the quality







The externality term is a constant for the consumer who is not aware of the im-
pact of her decision on the environment. Thus the externality term does not a⁄ect
consumer￿ s maximization problem. However, it will not be a constant for the reg-
ulator who maximizes social welfare. Social welfare is utilitarian and is de￿ned as
the sum of consumer surplus, monopolist￿ s pro￿t and average environmental quality
weighted by ￿.
For notational simplicity, let us denote Wi (resp. ￿i, CSi, Ei) the social welfare
(resp. the pro￿t, the consumer surplus and the average environmental quality) when
there is only one quality qi available on the market, and Wi;j (resp. ￿i;j, CSi;j,
Ei;j) the social welfare (resp. the pro￿t, the consumer surplus and the average
environmental quality) when the qualities qi and qj are available on the market. Let
pi be the price of the variant i.
3 Public intervention
Consider that the regulator sets a MQS denoted by qS. Such a standard is com-
pulsory. The monopolist either supplies a quality at least equal to qS or exits the
market. The monopolist may supply a lower quality than the standard and pretend
not to do so. Thus the regulator has to monitor and certify product quality. We
assume that regulator￿ s monitoring is almost perfect. In this setting, the probability
that the regulator catches the monopolist when cheating on quality is almost one.
The ￿xed cost of monitoring, denoted by K, is paid by the monopoly. We model
the interaction between the regulator and the monopolist as a Stackelberg game:
￿rst the regulator ￿xes a standard qS; second the monopolist decides to produce or
not at this level. Last, if it stays on the market, the monopolist chooses a price pS.
We solve the model backwards. Given the information problem, consumers do not
expect a quality level higher than qS, so, the monopolist produces a unique quality
6This guarantees equilibrium existence when the regulator interacts with a private certi￿er.







Where D(qS) is the demand for variant qS. Given a standard qS, the pro￿t of the







Note that since quality is a credence attribute of the product in the absence
of third party information disclosure on quality, under the unregulated equilibrium,
consumers would not expect but the lowest quality variant, q. The monopolist would







The regulator chooses qS that maximizes social welfare, WS, under the monop-
olist pricing rule, pS. After computations we obtain the following value for the
minimum quality standard:
qS =




+ 12￿￿ + 16￿2
9c
(3)
The introduction of the standard a⁄ects the quality and the price of the monopolist
product. Its impact on consumer surplus, monopolist￿ s pro￿t and average environ-
matal quality is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (i)With the introduction of the MQS, average environmental qual-
ity, E, increases with respect to the unregulated equilibrium. Consumer surplus and
pro￿ts may also increase for q su¢ ciently small. (ii) For ￿ su¢ ciently large we have
a range of K for which the monopolist will not participate although it is optimal.
Proof. In the appendix.
The MQS increases social welfare by increasing average environmental quality,
E. Since the hedonic price (
pS
qS ) of the good increases with qS, less consumers are
active in the market and consumers buying it bene￿t from a higher quality. The
bene￿t of a higher quality level is particularly high when q is small, in which case,
both, pro￿t and consumer surplus increase with the introduction of the MQS.
4 The NGO regime
In the absence of public intervention, we want to investigate the impact of the
existence of an NGO label on pro￿ts, consumer surplus and environmental quality.
6The NGO is a green nonpro￿t institution which objective is to maximize average
environmental quality. To realize such a task, the NGO has two instruments: the
label and the green advertisement. The label awarded by the NGO certi￿es that the
monopolist product satis￿es certain quality standards. It provides consumers with
credible information on the environmental quality of the labelled variant otherwise
unobservable. We assume that the certi￿cation technology is the same for all the
institutional frameworks, i.e. monitoring is almost perfect and the cost of monitoring
equals K. It is widely observed that environmental nonpro￿t organizations use the
media to promote a label and increase awareness of consumers toward environmental
issues.7 The green advertisement persuades consumers to buy the labelled quality
variant. We denote by ￿ the level of green advertisement. We assume an exogenous
level of green advertisement. The NGO can choose ￿N 2 f0;￿g. The impact of the
green advertisement on the utility of consumers that buy the labelled variant with




. The cost of the advertisement is 1
2￿2
N. The NGO charges
a fee to the monopolist that voluntarily adheres to the label. Given the nonpro￿t
nature of the NGO the fee equals the cost of monitoring plus the advertisement cost.
The stages of the game are the following: ￿rst the NGO announces a quality
level, qN to label and ￿N. The NGO charges a fee: K + 1
2￿2
N: In a second stage, the
monopolist either accepts or rejects the label. In case of acceptance, to bene￿t from
discrimination, the monopolist produces the lowest quality variant and the labelled
one, and set di⁄erentiated prices for both. In the third and last stage, consumers
buy the product and pro￿ts are realized.
To understand the impact of the green advertisement we develop the consumers
choice stage. The green advertisement does not a⁄ect the consumer ￿1, indi⁄erent




A consumer ￿2 is indi⁄erent between buying the labelled variant qN or buying the
lowest quality variant q when:
￿2qN + ￿N(qN ￿ q) ￿ pN + ￿EN = ￿2q ￿ p + ￿EN (4)
) ￿N
2 =
pN ￿ p ￿ ￿N(qN ￿ q)
qN ￿ q
:
7Examples of institutions making green advertisement can be found in the Global Ecolabelling
Network (GEN), an international non-pro￿t association of third-party, environmental performance
labelling organizations. See the mission statement of GEN at http://www.gen.gr.jp. See also
Eco-Action, Citizen Campaign for the Environment (CCE) among others.







the price of the labelled variant increases with the green advertisement allowing
the monopolist to get an extra green premium from the labelled good, pN = 1
2 ￿
qN(￿ + cqN) + ￿N(qN ￿ q)
￿
.











The monopolist will accept to buy the label only if pro￿ts are higher than in the
unregulated equilibrium. The monopolist participation constraint is given by ￿u;N￿
￿u ￿ K ￿ 1
2￿2
N > 0. We assume the monopolist participation constraint is satis￿ed.
General conditions are described in Lemma 1. Therefore, the equilibrium quality





The green advertisement allows to increase average environmental quality boosting
the demand of the high quality variant, see (5). It also increases the price at which
the labelled variant is sold, so it increases monopolistic revenues but high levels of
￿ may decrease monopolist￿ s pro￿t by the fee. The following Lemma proves the
pro￿tability of a (small) green advertisement.
Lemma 1 If the cost of monitoring K is su¢ ciently small, the monopolist always
accepts to buy the label for a su¢ ciently small level of green advertisement, ￿ > 0.
If moreover q <
3￿￿16c(￿￿￿)
6c , the monopolist participation constraint is satis￿ed for
all ￿.
Proof. In the appendix.
At this point we want to compare the performance of an eco-label certi￿ed by
the NGO and a MQS set by the regulator. The social welfare comparison of these
two regimes gives ambiguous results provided the many e⁄ects we have to take
into account. Obviously since environmental quality is maximized under the NGO
regime, the eco-label awarded by the NGO will generate higher social welfare the
higher the marginal social bene￿t from average environmental quality, ￿, is. On
the consumers and monopolist side, both bene￿t from the higher variety under the
8Figure 1: Consumers￿ranking over regimes as a function of willingness to pay.
NGO regime but it is probably too much di⁄erentiation. The next Proposition
summarizes our results.
Proposition 2 (i) The labelled quality level is higher than the MQS set by the
regulator: qN > qS. (ii) Middle-high willingness to pay consumers are better o⁄
under the MQS regime than under the NGO eco-label for su¢ ciently small levels of
green advertisement. (iii) The monopolist is better o⁄ under the MQS regime than
under the NGO regime for q small or ￿ small.
Proof. In the appendix.
The gain from di⁄erentiation, in the NGO regime, will be smaller the lower the
lowest quality available, q, is. The probably excessive di⁄erentiation explains why
the middle type consumer, with willingness to pay between ￿u;S and ￿S;N in Figure
1, is better o⁄ under the MQS regime, she ￿nds q very small and qN too high. The
monopolist, though, may prefer such excessive di⁄erentiation for high levels of ￿
since qS approaches qN as ￿ increases.
4.1 Interaction between the NGO and the regulator
In this section we suppose that both the NGO and the regulator are active in the
market. We study the e⁄ects of the presence of an NGO on the optimal standard
setting. We assume the regulator and the NGO play simultaneously. The monopolist
buys the label if the pro￿t from selling two variants, the labelled one and the MQS,
is higher than the pro￿t from selling a unique quality variant at the MQS level.




2 (the monitoring cost to the NGO and the regulator plus the cost of the

















N ￿ 2K ￿ 0:
For the moment, we ignore the monopolist participation constraint, indeed for K
su¢ ciently low the monopolist participation constraint will be satis￿ed at ￿ = 0.
First note that the NGO will propose to label the product at the same quality level
qN = ￿+￿N
2c , as without regulator intervention. Second, notice that the average
environmental quality ESN;N decreases with the regulator￿ s MQS, qSN.
The regulator chooses the MQS given the level of green advertisement and the
labelled quality variant. Under the regulator policy, it is compulsory to produce at
least at the MQS. The regulator￿ s problem is:
max
qSN





with d = f1;2g. It equals 1 in case the regulator decides not to intervene and 2
otherwise 8. Since ￿ < ￿
3, WSN;N is concave and the MQS will be smaller than the
labelled quality.






Evaluated at qN = ￿+￿N
2c it is:














The regulator￿ s MQS is a decreasing and concave function of ￿. Given that the MQS
chosen by the regulator is decreasing in ￿ the NGO is able to reduce the standard
level by making use of the green advertisement, ￿. The highest value for the MQS
is qSN (0) = ￿
4c.
If the standard is stringent, qSN > q, K still needs to be su¢ ciently small to
8We do not consider d = 0 because for any value of qSN it will be pro￿table for the NGO
to introduce a label (whenever the monopolist participation constraint is satis￿ed). Notice that




2(￿￿￿) ; which is unambiguously higher than
ES =
qS(￿￿cqS)
2(￿￿￿) ; given that qS ￿ qN and qSN ￿ qN.
10guarantee that WSN;N > Wu;N.
The next Proposition compares the optimal MQS in the presence of a label
alternative with the MQS set by the regulator in the absence of the NGO (see
Figure 2 below).
Figure 2: Comparison of quality levels.
Proposition 3 The highest possible standard level in the presence of the NGO is
smaller than the lowest standard level under the MQS regime. The NGO alternative
then decreases the scope for public intervention. The availability of green advertise-
ment reinforces the above result. Indeed for ￿ su¢ ciently high the regulator prefers
not to intervene.
Proof. In the appendix.
The introduction of the MQS decreases the demand for the labelled variant
compared to the NGO regime and this causes a decrease in average environmental
quality. The NGO then prefers the standard to be as low as possible. Both instru-
ments, the label and the green advertisement reduces the level of the optimal MQS
set by the regulator.
We expected to have less public intervention for ￿ low, but the opposite happened
(qSN is decreasing in ￿ for ￿N > 0). The higher ￿ is the better the NGO regime is
in terms of social welfare, since it maximizes average environmental quality. Thus,
it is natural to have less intervention for ￿ high.
In the presence of a private certi￿er the MQS task is to correct for the excessive
di⁄erentiation imposed by the NGO that sets qN irrespective of q. For ￿ high, such
11a task would be of lesser importance than to correct the externality associated with
quality.
Although eco-labels can be performed by any third party able to monitor and cer-
tify the quality of the product, many choose to be non-pro￿t. The mission statement
of many of the nonpro￿t institutions awarding eco-labels is to increase environmental
quality. There is evidence that nonpro￿t institutions follow their mission (Steinberg,
1986; Salamon et al., 2000), which strongly validates our previous analysis.
Nevertheless, given the variety of institutional arrangement certifying environ-
mental attributes: public, NGO and private for-pro￿t; in the next section we also
explore what would be the equilibrium in quality and green advertisement if the
private certi￿er would be a pro￿t maximizing certi￿er.
5 Private Certi￿er regime
In this section we consider the possibility that the label is awarded by a pro￿t
maximizing certi￿er. Following Alexander and Harding (2003) we assume the private
certi￿er has all the bargaining power, so she can extract all the monopoly￿ s surplus.
The private certi￿er faces the same ￿xed monitoring cost as the NGO and the
regulator, and may invest in green advertisement whenever pro￿table. We assume,
for simplicity, that the green advertisement has the same e⁄ect as in the previous
section and that it is equally costly.
The game goes as follows: ￿rst, the private certi￿er announces a quality level,
qP, a green advertisement level ￿P 2 f0;￿g and a fee for the label, F. In a second
stage, the monopolist either accepts or rejects the label. The monopolist, in case
of acceptance, produces two variants, the lowest quality and the labelled one,9 and
set di⁄erentiated prices for both. In the third and last stage, consumers buy the
product and pro￿ts are realized.
The monopolist voluntarily adheres to the label and pays a ￿xed fee, F. He
accepts to get the label whenever ￿u;P ￿ F ￿ ￿u. Since the private certi￿er has
all the bargaining power the ￿xed fee equals the pro￿ts gain with respect to the
unregulated equilibrium, F = ￿u;P ￿ ￿u. The PC pro￿ts are:
￿PC




P ￿ K (9)
9It is easy to check that if the monopolist accepts the label it is optimal for him to propose also
the low quality variant. Computations available upon request.
12The private certi￿er chooses qP that maximizes ￿PC
P under the monopolist￿ s pricing
rule. After computation, we obtain:
qP =
￿ + cq + ￿P
3c
Note that if ￿P = ￿N = ￿ the labelled quality is higher under the NGO regime
than under the PC regime, indeed qN ￿ qP =
￿￿2cq+￿
6c .
The objective of the private certi￿er is analogous to the monopolist￿ s objective.
She maximizes pro￿ts by di⁄erentiating enough the two quality variants. The NGO,
instead, maximizes environmental quality. The NGO sets a higher quality level
because she does not take into account the cost of quality, only indirectly through
prices and demand. The relative performance of one regime with respect to the
other depends on the impact of both regimes on the consumer.
In the absence of a regulator, we next summarize the gain or loss from having a
PC instead of the NGO certifying environmental quality.
Proposition 4 For ￿P = ￿N, (i) The NGO bene￿ts high willingness to pay con-
sumers. (ii) The private certi￿er performs better (Wu;P ￿ Wu;N > 0) if the social
marginal value of average environmental,￿, is su¢ ciently small or the highest willig-






Proof. In the appendix.
When both the NGO and the private certi￿er set the same level of green adver-
tisement we get a natural result. Social welfare is higher under the NGO regime,
compared to the PC regime, if the marginal social bene￿t of average environmental
quality is su¢ ciently high. High willingness to pay consumers are better o⁄ under
the NGO regime since qN is higher than qP. The identity of the ￿￿consumer that
would derive the same utility under the NGO and the PC regime10 is increasing in
￿. Then, the proportion of consumers that are better o⁄ under the NGO regime
decreases with ￿. Consumer surplus under the NGO regime also decreases with ￿.
10By equalizing the indirect utility from buying the label under the NGO regime with the indirect
utility from buying the label under the PC regimen, with equal levels of green advertisement, we




￿ + ￿ + c(qN + qP)
￿
that is equally well under either of the regimes.
The proportion of consumers better o⁄ under the NGO regime is 1￿F (￿P;N). Provided that both
qN and qP are increasing functions of ￿, the proportion of consumers better o⁄ in the NGO regime
decreases with ￿.
135.1 Interaction between the PC and the regulator
Suppose this time, that the private certi￿er and the regulator are active in the
market. We assume that the regulator and the PC play simultaneously. The PC
chooses the level of the quality variant, qPR, and green advertisement, ￿PR = f0;￿g,
to maximize its pro￿t ￿PC
SP;PR given the MQS chosen by the regulator, qSP.
The reaction function of the PC and regulator are qPR (qSP) =
￿+cqSP+￿PR
3c and





, respectively. If we restrict to
values of qSP and qPR that satisfy qSP < qPR, the relevant reaction function of the
regulator implies cqPR ￿ 2￿PR > 0.
We ￿rst explore what happens for ￿PR = 0. We ￿nd that there exists a unique
equilibrium characterized by qSP = ￿
5c and qPR = 2￿
5c, exactly the same quality levels
that maximize pro￿ts in the absence of information problem.11 This comes from
the fact that qSP is independent of ￿ when ￿PR tends to zero. In our setting if
￿ = 0 the monopolist would o⁄er the social optimal quality levels if quality was
observable.12 In this setting the MQS is useless. The regulator does not need to
correct the quality distortion, and with the introduction of a MQS total demand
decreases (it worsen the quantity distortion). The equilibrium qualities coincide
then, with the qualities chosen by the monopolist in the unregulated equilibrium if
quality was observable. Those quality levels coincide with the outcome of this game
given that the PC maximizes monopolists pro￿t. The di⁄erence comes from the cost
of the information revelation: 2K.
The next Proposition describes the equilibrium quality levels in the general case
when ￿PR > 0. When ￿PR is su¢ ciently high the regulator prefers not to intervene
since the demand for the MQS variant decreases with ￿.
Proposition 5 For ￿PR > 0; the equilibrium levels of the MQS and the label are:
(a) The public intervention case
￿





































11Computations from authors available upon request.
12See Spence (1975) and Lambertini et al. (1999).
14(b) The no public intervention case
￿
￿ > e ￿
￿
.




￿ + ￿PR + cq
￿













For ￿ su¢ ciently high the regulator prefers not to intervene.
Proof. In the appendix.
Note that qSP < qSN at ￿PR = 0. Since qSP ￿ qSN is decreasing in ￿PR at
￿PR = 0 then, for ￿ su¢ ciently small, the optimal MQS level will be smaller if the
regulator interacts with a PC than with an NGO. In the presence of an NGO or
a PC the role of the MQS is no longer to increase average environmental quality,
but to correct for the otherwise excessive di⁄erentiation
￿
qi ￿ q, i = N;PR
￿
in order
to increase pro￿ts and consumer surplus. In the PC regime such di⁄erentiation is
smaller since the PC maximizes monopolist pro￿ts. This explains why there is even
less public intervention (qSP < qSN) when the regulator faces a PC.
6 Conclusion
When environmental quality has credence attributes, certi￿cation is needed to pro-
duce other quality variant than the lowest one. Many agents can participate in
such a certi￿cation process. The private certi￿ers may be for-pro￿t or nonpro￿t
institutions. We divide these two by their objectives. We assume, as we observe in
the market for eco-labels, the NGO and the PC do green advertisement, whenever
pro￿table. The NGO may make use of the green advertisement to avoid undesirable
regulation. Indeed, high levels of green advertisement reduces the MQS level.
In the absence of a regulator we give general conditions under which the NGO
performs better than the private certi￿er. We ￿nd that the NGO always label a
higher quality variant than the private certi￿er.
For any level of green advertisement the presence of a private certi￿er in the
market decreases the scope for public intervention. The role of the MQS changes, it
has to correct for the otherwise excessive di⁄erentiation that decreases pro￿ts and
consumers surplus. Optimal environmental regulation depends upon the institution
interplaying with the regulator. When voluntary schemes (the label) are available,
15the regulator may be tougher in regulation (higher standard) in the presence of an
NGO since di⁄erentiation is higher under the NGO regime. On the contrary, she
should be more lax in the presence of a PC.
Throughout this paper we assume an exogenous level of green advertisemnt
though being the objectives of both private certi￿ers di⁄erent it is natural to expect
both will choose di⁄erent advertisement levels.13 An endogenous level of advertise-
ment will allow us to study its strategic choice by private certi￿ers. We leave it for
further research. Some other questions remain to be answer. We can consider other
public policy instruments when monitoring is not perfect, trying to understand un-
der which circumstances the regulator will o⁄er a MQS or a more ￿ exible policy
like a label. If both NGOs and the government compete o⁄ering di⁄erent labels the
information problem is crucial. Who consumers trust? A nonpro￿t organization
or a governmental agency to certify the quality of a product? Who may be easily
captured by the monopolist? Here the fund-raising problem and reputation of the
NGO should be reconsidered.
Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1:
Note that qS is increasing in ￿: Evaluating the limits of qS as ￿ approaches zero
and in￿nity we ￿nd that qS 2 [ ￿
3c; ￿
2c). (i) Consumer surplus and monopolist￿ s pro￿t
are both concave in q and reach a maximum at q = ￿
3c. For q su¢ ciently small both
CS and pro￿ts increase with the introduction of the standard, both may decrease if
￿ and q are su¢ ciently high. (ii) Whenever the standard is stringent and provided
that qS ￿ ￿
2c, environmental quality increases with the introduction of the MQS:









>0 (iii) De￿ne e K = ￿S and K￿ = WS ￿ Wu.
For K 2 [ e K;K￿] the monopolist prefers to exit the market, though the MQS is
e¢ cient. K￿ can be rewritten as K￿ = e K + X, with X = ￿￿u + (CSS ￿ CSu) +
￿(ES￿Eu). From a simple enveloppe theorem argument we note that X is increasing
in ￿. There exist ￿￿ such that e K < K￿ for ￿ > ￿￿, for K 2 [ e K;K￿] it will be optimal
to subsidize the monopolist to pay the fee.
Proof of Lemma 1
The monopolist extra pro￿ts from the label with green advertisement is, Net￿ (￿) =
￿u;N ￿ ￿u ￿ 1
2￿2
N ￿ K. We ￿rst consider the case without green advertisement to
13We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this to us.
16understand what determines the participation of the monopolist and the interplay
between the NGO and the monopolist. Net￿(0) = (￿￿2cq)
3
32c(￿￿￿) ￿ K; since ￿ > 2cq,
Net￿(0) > 0 for K su¢ ciently small. The NGO could always set ￿N = 0 and sell
the label since the monopolist participation constraint will be satis￿ed. Moreover
Net￿ (￿) is increasing at ￿ = 0. Thus, net pro￿ts are positive for ￿ and K su¢ -
ciently small. They will be positive for all ￿ if q <
3￿￿16c(￿￿￿)
6c , for which Net￿ (￿)
is convex at ￿ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) See the proof of Proposition 1, qS < ￿
2c ￿ qN. (ii) Let ￿u;S being the








; and ￿S;N the indi⁄erent consumer between the public MQS and
the private label, ￿S;N =
￿




2(qN￿qS) . For ￿ su¢ ciently small the
following ordering is satis￿ed: ￿N
1 < ￿u;S < ￿S;N. Since qS ￿ qN and qS > q, all
consumers with willingness to pay ￿u;S < ￿ < ￿S;N are better o⁄ under the MQS
regime. Consumers with wilingness to pay ￿N
1 > ￿ > ￿u;S and ￿ > ￿S;N are better
o⁄buying the labelled quality variant under the NGO regime than buying the MQS
quality. (iii) At ￿ = 0, ￿
3c ￿ qS ￿ ￿
2c = qN; when q = 0, there is only one variant
in the market, pro￿ts under the NGO regime are, then, lower than under the MQS
regime provided that pro￿ts are decreasing in q for q > ￿
3c. If q is su¢ ciently high,
pro￿ts under the NGO regime are larger due to the gain in di⁄erentiation from the
label. Then, in general for ￿;q > 0, pro￿ts under the NGO regime will be higher
than under the MQS regime for ￿ high (because qS approaches qN) and for q high
(from quality di⁄erentiation).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Since qSN is decreasing in ￿N it reaches its maximum level at ￿N = 0, thus
qSN ￿ ￿
4c < ￿












3. There exist ￿ < ￿
3 such that for any
value of q the regulator prefers not to intervene.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Assume that ￿N = ￿P = ￿.(i) We have that ￿N;P is the indi⁄erent con-




￿ + c(qN + qP) ￿ ￿
￿


















; thus ￿N;P > ￿u;N > ￿u;P. Consumers with will-
ingness to pay ￿u;P < ￿ < ￿N;P are better o⁄under the PC regime. Consumers with
17willingness to pay ￿ > ￿N;P prefer the NGO regime over the PC regime. Thus the
NGO serves high willingness to pay consumers. (ii) Social welfare comparison,
Wu;P ￿ Wu;N =
￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ 2cq
￿2 ￿








5(￿ ￿ 2cq + ￿) ￿ 8￿
￿
> 0, then, Wu;P ￿ Wu;N > 0. The NGO regime, then, is
socially preferred to the PC regime for ￿ su¢ ciently low and ￿ is su¢ ciently high.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Here we determine the equilibrium when the regulator faces a private certi￿er.
The regulator best response, qSP (qPR), is increasing and concave for cqPR > 2￿PR.
We just consider the concave part provided that qSP < qPR. Figure 3 (case a) and
Figure 4 (case b) shows the shape of the best response function of the regulator.14.
The best response of the PC is a straight line. Let A be the value of qPR satisfying
qSP (qPR) = 0 and B the value of qPR (qSP) when qSP = 0. De￿ne e ￿ as the value
of ￿ such that A = B, e ￿ < 1
4￿ + 1
6￿. For 0 < ￿ < 1
4￿ + 1
6￿ the slope of the PC￿ s
best response is higher than the slope of the regulator￿ s best response at A. It is
easy to check that, for ￿ > ￿
4 +
￿
6, qSP de￿ned as in Proposition 5 (case a) is smaller
than zero, implying a non intervention of the regulator. The two possible cases are
represented below.
Figure 3: Case a
14The ￿rst derivative of qSP (qPR) tends to
1
2 when qPR tends to in￿nity (in the concave part)
this means that the best response of the regulator is increasing in qPR for all qPR >
2￿
c .
18Figure 4: Case b
References
Alexander, M. and Harding, M., 2003, ￿Self-Regulation and the Certi￿cation of the
European Information Economy: The case of e-Healthcare Information Provision,￿
Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Working Paper no 154.
Auriol, E. and S. Schilizzi, 2003, ￿Quality signaling through certi￿cation. Theory
and an application to agricultural seed markets,￿IDEI Working Paper, no 165.
Bar-Gill, O. and C. Fershtman, 2005, ￿Public policy with endogenous preferences,￿
Journal of Public Economic Theory 7(5), 841-857.
Blend, J., ￿Possibilities for an e⁄ective ecolabel: A look at structural alternatives,￿
Available at http://www.msu.edu/course/aec/810/ecolabel.htm.
Brekke K. A., S. Kverndokk and K. Nyborg, 2003, ￿An economic model of moral
motivation,￿Journal of Public Economics 87, 1967-1983.
Cason, T. and L. Gangadharan, 2002, ￿Environmental Labeling and Incomplete
Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets,￿ Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management 43, 113 134.
Crampes, C. and H. Hollander, 1995, ￿Duopoly and Quality Standards,￿European
Economic Review 35, 613-633.
Cremer, H. and J. F. Thisse, 1994, ￿Commodity taxation in a di⁄erentiated
oligopoly,￿International Economic Review 35, 613-633.
19Cremer, H. and J.F. Thisse, 1999, ￿On the taxation of polluting products in a
di⁄erentiated industry￿European Economic Review 43, 575-594.
Khanna, M., 2001, ￿Non-mandatoy approaches to environmental protection,￿Jour-
nal of Economic Surveys 15, 291-324.
Heyes, A. and J. Maxwell, 2004, ￿Private vs Public Regulation: Political Econ-
omy of the International Environment,￿Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 48, 978-996.
Ibanez, L. and A. Stenger, 2000, ￿Environment and Food Safety in Agriculture: Are
Labels E¢ cient?￿Australian Economic Papers 39, 452-464.
Lambertini, L. and M. Mosca, 1999, ￿On the Regulation of Vertically Di⁄erentiated
Market,￿Australian Economic Papers 38, 354-366.
Lombardini-Riipinen, C., 2002, ￿Buying Green: The Social Reward Trap,￿Univer-
sity of Helsinki, Working Papers.
Mussa, M. and S. Rosen, 1978, ￿Monopoly and Product Quality,￿Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 18, 301-317.
Petrakis, E., E. Sartzetakis and A.. Xepapadeas, 2005, ￿Envi-
ronmental Information Provision as a Public Policy Instrument,￿
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy: 4(1), Article 14.
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol4/iss1/art14.
Salamon, L., M. Leslie, C. Hemes, and K. Chinnock, 2000, ￿The Nonpro￿t sector:
For What and for Whom?￿ John Hopkins Comparative Nonpro￿t Sector Project
no.37.
Spence, A. M., 1975, ￿Monopoly, quality, and regulation,￿ Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics 6, 417-429.
Steinberg, R., 1986, ￿The revealed objective functions of nonpro￿t ￿rms,￿RAND
Journal of Economics 17, 508-526.
Tirole, J., 1998, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Yu, Z., 2005, ￿Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Compe-
tition for Political In￿ uence￿Review of Economic Studies 72, 269-286.
20